Rather, it is rife with inaccurate representations and speculation that fall well outside the realm of accepted scientific debate. We strongly disagree with several key points within the editorial, most importantly those which imply misconduct on the part of GSK and have identified some of these issues below. On this basis, GSK believes that it is necessary for the journal to withdraw this editorial from the website and refrain from publishing it in hard copy, until the journal has investigated these inaccuracies and unsubstantiated allegations.
The editorial's overarching scientific perspective seems to rest primarily upon a restatement of Dr Nissen's well-publicized 2007 hypothesis inferred from limited meta-analyses of primarily short-term data from glycaemic-control studies. However, this hypothesis has not been confirmed by more recent and considerably more robust evidence from prospective, long-term cardiovascular outcomes studies. We address some of the misconceptions in his scientific argument below.
1. 'The rosiglitazone development programme was small, although typical of diabetes drugs in that era, consisting of five trials involving 2902 patients, mostly short-term (26 week) glycaemic-control studies.'
GSK disagrees with the author's assertions. In fact, the development program was at that time (November 1998) one of the largest New Drug Applications (NDA) submitted to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Although five studies were described in the report by the FDA medical reviewer, the complete NDA submitted by GSK 2. 'The effect on LDL-C was largely dismissed.' GSK disagrees. Data regarding the effect of rosiglitazone on LDL-C have not been dismissed. LDL-C changes from baseline similar to those cited in the editorial have been included in rosiglitazone product labelling from the very first approved label at launch.
3. 'However, one prominent diabetes expert was . . . persuaded to sign an agreement barring him from publicly expressing concerns about the safety of the drug.'
The diabetes expert referred to in the editorial is Dr John Buse. The document that Dr Buse signed was not an agreement barring him from speaking but was a factual correction regarding data, which did not bar him from speaking at all. In fact, Dr Buse subsequently communicated his views regarding the safety of rosiglitazone to FDA.
4. 'Although the ADOPT study was actually performed, it was not powered to assess cardiovascular outcomes and did not adjudicate cardiovascular events.'
ADOPT was a Phase 4 commitment to FDA. It was a long-term study to include assessment of rosiglitazone on maintenance/restoration of insulin secretion by the pancreatic beta-cell and examination of the overall safety profile of rosiglitazone, including incidence of ALT elevations, cardiovascular and haematological events, and changes in body weight and lipids. 7. 'When a meta-analysis of rosiglitazone was eventually submitted for publication, the company subverted the editorial review process by stealing a copy of the manuscript and used this advance knowledge inappropriately to unblind an ongoing randomized trial.' This is simply not true. GlaxoSmithKline acknowledges receiving a faxed copy of the manuscript unsolicited from one of the reviewers, a fact that the reviewer has publicly acknowledged. 5 At no time did GSK act in any way to subvert the editorial review process, let alone 'steal' a manuscript. The false allegation that GSK and/or its employees were guilty of criminal conduct in stealing the manuscript is defamatory and damaging. European Heart Journal (2010) 31, 1282-1285 DREAM trials and interim results of RECORD. The overall conclusion by FDA, as stated in the boxed warning, is 'in their entirety, the available data on the risk of myocardial ischaemia are inconclusive.'
9. 'This study postulated an 11% annual event rate, but observed only a 2.5% rate.'
GSK disagrees with the implication that it intentionally underpowered the RECORD study. The statistical design was agreed with the EMEA before the study began. The observed event rate for cardiovascular events in RECORD was less than originally postulated when the study was designed (as has been seen in many other recently reported cardiovascular outcomes trials), in part due to advances in standard of care for cardiovascular disease. The RECORD study did, however, achieve its primary endpoint according to its prespecified non-inferiority margin, 6 a margin which is more stringent than what is suggested in the 2008 FDA guidance.
10. 'The HR for myocardial infarction was 1.14, but upper 95% CI reached 1.63.'
In RECORD, there was no statistically significant difference for myocardial infarction in patients on rosiglitazone vs. comparator. Additionally, Dr Nissen does not provide results for other secondary endpoints, including arguably the most clinically important parameter of mortality. Hazard ratios from RECORD for cardiovascular mortality (HR 0.84, 95% CI 0.59 -1.18) and for total mortality (HR 0.86, 95% CI 0.68 -1.08) were both numerically less than unity, with confidence intervals within the pre-specified noninferiority margin.
11. 'About 40% of patients were no longer taking rosiglitazone by the end of the trial, further diluting any safety signals.'
GlaxoSmithKline disagrees with the author's characterization. In studies evaluating cardiovascular safety, the proportion of follow-up time to which patients were exposed to randomized study medication is more relevant than the proportion that were on the medication at the final visit. As stated in the publication of the final results from RECORD in The Lancet, patients in the rosiglitazone arm received rosiglitazone for 88% of total person-years follow-up, and patients in the control arm received control for 83% of total person-years follow-up.
12. 'A consensus treatment algorithm issued by the American Diabetes Association and European Association for the Study of Diabetes "unanimously advised against using rosiglitazone".' 14. 'Although early warnings were issued for the risk of heart failure, these warnings went largely unheeded in the face of aggressive marketing and promotion suggesting cardiovascular benefits.'
Heart failure is a well-known class effect of the thiazolidinedione class, and the original US labelling for rosiglitazone contained a Precaution for 'Use in Patients with Heart Failure' describing preclinical effects and echocardiographic studies. As additional data on heart failure have become available, the labelling has been updated. Currently, the labelling for both marketed thiazolidinediones, rosiglitazone and pioglitazone, contains a boxed warning regarding heart failure as well as a contraindication to initiate TZD use in patients with class III -IV CHF. GlaxoSmithKline standard practice is to include full fair balance information, including cardiovascular risks, on all marketing and promotional materials, and to disseminate the labelling on every sales call with healthcare professionals. The final results of RECORD showed that rosiglitazone met the pre-defined statistical criteria for demonstrating no excess cardiovascular risk relative to other standard diabetes medications. These clinical trial data are consistent with data from other large, independent, cardiovascular outcomes trials containing significant exposure to rosiglitazone that have reported since 2007, including the Veterans' Administration-sponsored VADT trial and the NIH-sponsored ACCORD and BARI-2D trials. GlaxoSmithKline is reassured by the evidence from these large prospective, randomized trials, which provide a much more reliable assessment of cardiovascular safety than hypotheses-generating meta-analyses. If fair and appropriate weight is given to the evidence from larger interventional studies that were prospectively designed and included an adjudication process for cardiovascular events, the data on rosiglitazone compel a different conclusion than that reached by the editorialist.
GlaxoSmithKline looks forward to a response from the journal and to an opportunity to promptly rectify the public record. The painful truth Medical journals play a pivotal role in discussion of scientific issues and healthcare policy. This attempt by a large pharmaceutical company (GSK) to censor public debate about a critical public health issue is unacceptable and represents a grave threat to academic freedom. Pharmaceutical companies have abundant resources for delivering their messages to physicians and the public. Physician -scientists essentially have only medical journals through which we communicate our scientific ideas and concerns. If we allow a pharmaceutical company to control what we are allowed to publish, scientific discussion and debate would suffer irreparable harm. This demand from GSK constitutes an unacceptable attempt to interfere with the editorial decisions of a major medical journal.
Moncef Slaoui
The assertions by GSK in Dr Slaoui's Letter are categorically incorrect and distort the facts.
The following represents a point-by-point response to the GSK letter:
1. The rosiglitazone development programme was small, although typical of diabetes drugs in that era, consisting of five trials involving 2902 patients, mostly shortterm (26 weeks) glycaemic control studies.
The FDA reviewer makes it clear that the studies involving 2902 patients formed the primary basis for approval. 1 (Table 8. 
H.3.2)
Studies done early in a development program, particularly those using subtherapeutic dosages of drugs or very short-term therapy are not considered part of the primary basis for approval. Furthermore, the FDA now recognizes that 1 year follow-up in a minority of patients is inadequate. In their recent guidance to Industry, the Agency states that: 'It is likely that the controlled trials will need to last more than the typical 3 to 6 months duration to obtain enough events and to provide data on longerterm cardiovascular risk (e.g. minimum 2 years) for these chronically used therapies'.
2. The effect on LDL-C was largely dismissed.
The Advisory Committee that approved rosiglitazone focused primary on hepatic safety. Virtually all media reports covering the Advisory Committee emphasized the lack of troglitazone-like hepatotoxicity, which was the principal area of concern discussed by the Advisory Committee. 3. However, one prominent diabetes expert was . . . persuaded to sign an agreement barring him from publicly expressing concerns about the safety of the drug.
The intimidation of Dr John Buse by GSK was fully described in a report issued by US Senate Committee on Finance. 3 The Senate Report quotes an e-mail message from Dr Buse to me dated 23 October 2005 following publication of our manuscript describing the risks of the diabetes drug muraglitazar. In that e-mail, Buse stated: 'Steve: Wow! Great job on the muraglitazar article. I did a similar analysis of the data at rosiglitazone's initial FDA approval based on the slides that were presented at the FDA hearings and found a similar association of increased severe CVD events. I presented it at the Endocrine Society and ADA meetings that summer. Immediately the company's leadership contact (sic) my chairman and a short and ugly set of interchanges occurred over a period of about a week ending in my having to sign some legal document in which I agreed not to discuss this issue further in public. I was certainly intimidated by them but frankly did not have the granularity of data that you had and decided that it was not worth it'.
In an e-mail to GSK, Dr Buse wrote: 'Please call off the dogs. I cannot remain civilized much longer under this kind of heat'. 3 4. Although the ADOPT study was actually performed, it was not powered to assess cardiovascular outcomes and did not adjudicate cardiovascular events.
Dr Slaoui doesn't challenge my assertion that the Adopt Trial did not adjudicate cardiovascular events and was not powered for cardiovascular outcomes. He says the study was designed, among other goals, to examine 'cardiovascular and haematological events'. How exactly would this be accomplished without systematically recording and adjudicating of cardiovascular events?
5. In January 2007, concerned about the cardiovascular safety of the TZD class, we requested access to patient-level data from the manufacturers of both rosiglitazone, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and pioglitazone, Takeda. The makers of pioglitazone agreed, but the manufacturer of rosiglitazone declined.
In an e-mail to me dated 26 February 2007, a GSK senior vice president wrote: 'The analyses must be undertaken as collaboration between the academic group and GSK scientific personnel (e.g. statisticians, clinicians) . . . GSK would conduct the agreed analysis'. I responded with the following comments: 'It would be acceptable for GSK to conduct an analysis, but our standards (and current journal rules) require independent analysis by an academic coordinating centre. Accordingly, the contract would need to stipulate that the complete database would be transferred to the coordinating centre for independent confirmation of the results'.
The company was unwilling to agree to an independent analysis. The full e-mail messages were provided to the US Senate for their investigation. The Senate report provides additional details. 4 6. Both GSK analyses revealed an increased risk of ischaemic myocardial events and were quietly posted on the company's clinical trials register and actually shared with the FDA. However, throughout this period, neither the company nor the FDA revealed these findings to the medical community nor to the public.
Neither the company, nor the FDA, made any public statement warning about the risk of adverse ischaemic events until after our meta-analysis was published in May 2007. Physicians and the public were shocked by these revelations when our article appeared 21 May 2007. The posting of results on an obscure website is not a substitute for a peerreviewed publication or clear public statements warning about the risk of the drug. When GSK first discovered an increased risk of myocardial ischaemia in 2005, they had an implicit moral obligation to warn physicians and patients, which they failed to do.
7. When a meta-analysis of rosiglitazone was eventually submitted for publication, the company subverted the editorial review process by stealing a copy of the Letters to the Editor
